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the international capital markets has been and will be determined by
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cient for sustained capital inflows nor is it the guarantee for in-
creased investment activities. Rather, domestic economic policy has
to change in accordance: Liberalization matters, not only member-
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The future integration of the transition economies of central and east-
ern Europe into the international capital market will to a great degree
be shaped by the process of European Union (EU) enlargement. At
least for the capital markets of the more advanced transition econo-
mies, the White Book of the EU and the Agenda 2000 have important
implications. Most importantly, membership in the EU requires the
abolition of remaining capital controls (except for episodes of severe
macroeconomic imbalances) and postulates the adoption of common
capital market and banking regulations, notably of the EU's Second
Banking Directive. Because the eastern enlargement of the EU shares
many similarities with the process of southern enlargement, it is useful
to study the effects that the latter has had for the integration of those
new members into international capital flows.
This contribution starts by giving a short account of why southern
enlargement differed from other liberalization periods and why it is of
particular relevance for the new members. It then looks at potential
links between capital account liberalization and growth, derives the
stylized facts of enlargement, and attempts to explain the lack of re-semblance of the expected and actual integration effects. Finally, the
conclusions for the new candidates for EU-membership are drawn.
We find that the southern EU members and the transition economies
recently have appeared to be surprisingly similar with regard to the vol-
ume and structure of FDI. In order to isolate intra-EU capital flows, we
specifically look at capital imports from Germany. In the early 1990s,
when Germany was a net capital importer overall, net capital flows
from Germany into the two regions were positive. Also, the structure of
German foreign direct investment looks more similar for the two groups
of countries than for the rest of Europe. The main difference between
the two regions is the greater importance of portfolio investment for the
southern states. Yet, as the transition process continues, there is quite
a potential for increased portfolio flows to central and eastern Europe
as market opportunities still differ quite substantially from those in more
developed market economies.
The fact that net capital flows into the southern economies do not
appear to be directly linked to the process of enlargement as such
points to the hypothesis that membership alone in a regional arrange-
ment like the European Union
1 cannot guarantee increased investment
1 Throughout the paper the term European Union will be also used as a synonym for
the predecessor European Community.activities and accelerated growth. Domestic economic policy has to
change in accordance with the commitments arising from the regional
arrangement to foster a sustainable development of the economy.
Therefore, the main conclusion of this contribution and consequently
the message for the central and eastern European transition econo-
mies is that reforms at the EU level need to be accompanied by struc-
tural reforms at the national level: liberalization matters, not only mem-
bership.
2. Capital Account Liberalization and Growth
Capital account liberalization and structural reforms at the national
level have not been a unique experience of the new southern members
of the EU.
2 Many developing countries have embarked upon encom-
passing reform and liberalization programs, hereby spurring growth
We restrict ourselves predominantly to the analysis of Greece, Spain, and Portugal
which in 1981 (Greece) and 1986, respectively, joined the EU. It would also be inter-
esting to compare the experience of these new member states to that of Ireland
which has made remarkable achievements in converging to EU-levels of per capita
income. The main reason why we confine our analysis mainly to the southern mem-
bers is the fact that Ireland joined the EU already in the early 1970s. Ireland's experi-
ences with integration were made in a completely different external environment, in
particular with regard to international capital markets, which complicates a compari-
son with later enlargements. We include Ireland only at the end for the analysis
whether the Gross Domestic Product per capita of the "Four Poor" have converged
towards the average of all 15 EU members. For an encompassing analysis see
Laaser (1997) who argues that Ireland established sound economic policies only
quite some time after becoming a member of the EU. Hence, the country has been
able to reap the rewards from a liberal market economy, from EU transfers, and from
the common European market only within the last years.and investment. Yet, EU membership is an important goal for the
transition economies of central and eastern Europe, evidently so be-
cause the countries hope to reap benefits which reforms at the national
level alone would not bring about. This suggests that EU membership
has special characteristics and that studying its implications holds im-
portant lessons for the new members.
2.1 What is Special About Enlargement?
The experience with the southern enlargement of the EU and the ac-
companied liberalization of capital flows indeed differs from other lib-
eralization experiences. During the process of EU enlargement, capital
account liberalization and other elements of economic integration have
been combined. These other elements comprise the creation of a
common market, the participation in the structural funds and in the
CAP of the EU as well as the adoption of a common legal and institu-
tional framework. This combination can have positive feedback effects
on the success of capital account liberalization. Combining capital ac-
count liberalization and a broader adjustment package may ease the
adjustment to adverse external shocks. Integration potentially reduces
uncertainty about future investment conditions. Ceteris paribus, thisshould contribute to a greater inflow of irreversible, long-term invest-
ment because the value of postponing investment is reduced. By tying
the hands of domestic policymakers, integration and enlargement
make a reversal of policies in the future less likely, hereby reducing
uncertainty and promoting investment. However, the access to transfer
payments which EU accession entails might also undermine the re-
solve of new members to introduce reforms which would promote eco-
nomic growth.
There are several reasons that justify a comparison of southern and
eastern enlargement of the EU. Apart from similarity in expected inte-
gration effects as mentioned above, the two groups of countries will
have similar comparative advantages within an enlarged Union. Both
regions industrialized late compared to the core EU-countries and be-
came integrated into the international markets during the second half of
the last century. Hence, they shared similarities prior to the take-over of
the communist regime. Later on, while the economies of central and
eastern Europe were dominated during the socialist period by the state,
the southern European countries had - until the 1980s - an overin-
flated and cumbersome state that played the principal role in the econ-
omy.It might also be objected to our approach that eastern enlargement
takes place under entirely different conditions than southern enlarge-
ment because the Single Market has already been created. We agree
that the pre-conditions for membership have changed. The conclusion
that we draw from this is, however, that lessons regarding policies
needed for a successful enlargement become more important in the
new environment.
Therefore, studying the process of southern enlargement is highly
relevant for the transition economies. It allows a first assessment of
integration effects and of the magnitude of capital flows that can be ex-
pected. In order to limit the analysis, the paper will mainly look at the
impact of integration and of capital account liberalization for the struc-
ture and volume of financial flows. We will look at the capital inflows of
southern Europe and of central and eastern Europe from all partner
countries as well as at the German capital exports into the two regions
since this allows us to isolate developments within Europe to the best
possible degree. Some tentative conclusions regarding the impact of
liberalization for investment and growth will be drawn.2.2 How can Economic Growth be Explained?
From a theoretical point of view, the liberalization of capital flows can
have positive static and dynamic effects on domestic investment and
growth. Most importantly, liberalizing capital flows allows a country to
draw on foreign savings to finance domestic investment. Neoclassical
growth accounting would predict that mobile capital flows primarily out
of capital-abundant developed economies into capital-strapped devel-
oping and transition economies. This is because by the law of diminish-
ing returns marginal returns to capital in the latter should exceed mar-
ginal returns in the former. By lifting capital controls, the world capital
stock is allocated optimally, and growth rates increase until a new
steady state level of income is reached.
Yet, the traditional growth models cannot convincingly account for the
fact that capital is typically found to be much less mobile internationally
than the standard theory assumes. Lucas (1990) has used a model in-
corporating a human capital externality to explain why capital flows to
developing countries have - at least until very recently - remained lim-
ited to an extent incompatible with neoclassical growth accounting.
3 He
3 This is true even when taking into account that capital is actually far from perfectly
mobile internationally (Feldstein and Horioka 1980).8
argues that the return to physical capital will ceteris paribus be highest
where the endowment with human capital is highest, and that human
capital creates a positive externality which disproportionately increases
the return to physical capital. The reason for capital flows to developing
countries remaining limited would then be that the rates of return to
physical capital in developing countries are constrained by low en-
dowments with human capital. Thus, a lack of human capital is able to
explain a lack of capital inflows. Conversely then, relative abundance of
human capital should be expected to attract foreign capital.
A corollary of this framework is that investment into human capital
can increase a country's attractiveness for foreign investors. Pre-
sumably, however, these investments into human capital must be fi-
nanced from domestic rather than foreign savings (Barro et al. 1995).
This is because securing access to external financial sources for in-
vestment into human capital is already a difficult task in a domestic
setting. International borrowing for investment into human capital is
virtually impossible. This can explain why capital mobility - including
mobility of human capital - is less than perfect, and why convergence
remains less pronounced than neoclassical growth theory would pre-
dict. At the same time, creating a legal and institutional frameworkconducive to international financing of investment into human capital
would be growth-promoting.
These results point to the beneficial effects of EU enlargement. The
new member states are already relatively well-endowed with human
capital, and enlargement brings about a more stable institutional envi-
ronment. Incidentally, and putting measurement problems aside, the
data suggest that the transition economies have a higher endowment
in human capital than the southern members of the EU (Barro and Lee
1996) A priori, this would suggest that a lack of access to skilled and
trained personnel is not an obstacle to foreign investment into these
economies.
One shortcoming of the standard neo-classical model, however, is its
inability to explain long-run economic growth. Growth merely occurs as
a one-time adjustment to a new steady state; long-run growth is bound
to be zero. Short-run growth comes only in response to exogenous
shocks such as technological innovations, increases in the savings
rate, or an abolition of capital controls.
Dynamic growth effects can be captured in models of endogenous
growth. One implication of this class of models is that technological in-
novations or human capital accumulation can give rise to a positive10
externality so that the marginal returns to investment need not de-
crease. Accumulation of technological knowledge or of human capital
can arise endogenously and can be a source of sustained long-run
growth. Baldwin and Forslid (1996) argue that the growth effects of a
policy measure depend on the incipient increase in Tobin's q, i.e., the
ratio of the market value of capital and its replacement costs. Their re-
sults are driven by the fact that investment in knowledge capital re-
duces the marginal costs of production, giving rise to worldwide
economies of scale. In particular, they show that financial liberalization
in the form of (i) the liberalization of the market entry for new domestic
or foreign banks, and/or (ii) the liberalization of international financial
transactions, which lowers the marginal costs of domestic financial in-
termediaries to make loans abroad, are growth-promoting. Because of
the various distortions in the domestic banking systems both of the
southern members prior to enlargement and in the transition econo-
mies, this mechanism could be particularly relevant during enlarge-
ment.
4
4 See Caminal et al. and Borges (1990) for studies of the Spanish and Portuguese fi-
nancial system. An overview of banking reforms in transition economies is given in
Buch(1996).11
2.3 Is there a Case for Capital Controls?
While the benefits from integrating into the international capital market
seem to be relatively obvious, public and academic debate about the
necessity to restrict (short-term) capital flows abounds. Not least in re-
sponse to the recent turmoil on Asia's foreign exchange and financial
markets, such outright restrictions (Tobin taxes on short-term capital
flows, for example), are more and more often proposed as a cushion
against highly volatile financial flows. While we cannot go into a com-
prehensive discussion of the costs and benefits of such measures, two
approaches which call into question the benefits of capital controls are
worthwhile mentioning:
First, Laban and Larrain (1997) have shown that abolishing controls
on capital outflows may increase net inflows because the liberalization
of capital flows lowers the irreversibility of investment. In a situation of
general uncertainty about the future, foreign investors gain from exploit-
ing an option value of waiting, from postponing their investment, and
from waiting for better information about future policies. Incidentally,
the fact that an option value of waiting exists can explain why marginal
rates of returns across countries are not equalized even in the absence
of capital controls. Hence, the paper by Laban and Larrain predicts an12
increase in investment in response to (i) an abolition of capital controls
and (ii) reduction of uncertainty about the future. This finding directly
links to the issue of EU enlargement because enlargement implies
both reduced barriers to the free flow of capital and a reduction of un-
certainty, and should thus lead to higher investment.
Second, Bartolini and Drazen (1997) show that capital controls can
have negative effects on total investment because they send negative
signals about future policies to investors. Their result hinges on the as-
sumption that information about the type of a government is asymmet-
rically distributed between investors and governments. Governments
can raise revenue by taxing the capital stock in their country, and they
differ with respect to the alternative sources of income to which they
have access. In this model, the imposition of capital controls sends a
negative signal to investors that governments lack alternative sources
of income and are thus likely to impose controls in the future. Con-
versely, abolishing controls on capital outflows sends a positive signal
and increases net capital inflows.
The plea for capital controls is oftentimes justified on the grounds
that controls on short-term capital discourage highly volatile portfolio
capital flows while not tampering with "healthy" and sustainable flows13 Bjbiiothek des Institute
of foreign direct investment. Portfolio capital flows, it is argued, do not
necessarily add to the capital stock of an economy and are, in addition,
easily reversed.
This argument has some truth to it because the most important
channel through which new technologies can be introduced is FDI by
transnational corporations. Hence, inflows of FDI not only foster eco-
nomic growth by supplementing domestic savings, but also by provid-
ing access to new technologies. FDI may result directly in the importing
of more advanced technologies, but also in the transfer of managerial
and production-oriented skills. In addition, FDI may generate positive
externalities in that domestic firms may be able to acquire new knowl-
edge while supplying inputs to the foreign firm or while competing with
it for customers (Bertschek 1995). This in turn may stimulate additional
domestic investment. However, the extent to which new foreign tech-
nology can be absorbed by the host economy, be it directly via domes-
tic subsidiaries of foreign transnational corporations or indirectly via
spillovers to domestic firms, must be expected to depend on the stock
of human capital present in the host economy, as human capital and
advanced technology tend to be complementary inputs (Lichtenberg
1993). Empirical studies suggest that inward FDI can have positive14
externalities for countries with a relatively good human capital endow-
ment (Borensztein et al. 1994) and in countries which follow an export-
promoting development strategy (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996).
However, it would be grossly misleading to attribute positive growth
effects to FDI flows alone. Foreign direct investment contributes only a
relatively small share to global capital flows. In 1996, the share of FDI
inflows in global capital inflows was only 16 percent (IMF 1998a).
Portfolio and other forms of capital transfers - notably bank credits -
can also contribute to economic growth because they allow worldwide
portfolios to be optimized, individual investment risks to be lowered,
and - to the extent that savers are risk averse - overall savings to in-
crease.
In addition to the better diversification of risk that the liberalization of
portfolio capital allows, the presence of foreign investors in the home
market may be to the benefit of the home country because market li-
quidity increases. Typically, bond and stock markets in emerging mar-
ket economies are relatively illiquid. Hence, due to a low trading vol-
ume, asset prices may be quite volatile, and investors may find them-
selves unable to divest assets unless they accept high discounts. Ac-
cess to international bank credit can furthermore enhance the quality of15
domestic investment if foreign banks have better risk assessment skills
than the incumbent domestic banks.
To sum up, our brief review of the literature on capital account liber-
alization leads us to expect (i) an inflow of capital in response to the
abolition of capital controls, (ii) a net flow of funds towards countries
with high real rates of return on capital, particularly if the quality of hu-
man capital is high, and (iii) a relatively high share of long-term invest-
ment (such as FDI) in countries with credible policies.
5
3. Enlargement and Capital Flows — the Stylized Facts
Both economic integration with the EU and the transformation of for-
merly centrally planned economies are important structural changes
which can be expected to exert a significant impact on cross-border
capital flows. After accession, higher rates of return in the new member
countries should trigger more capital imports and should lead to higher
investment ratios. Until the new steady state is reached, investment
and growth should increase.
5 Buch et al. (1998) show that governments can influence the structure of capital flows
towards relatively more long-term investment by implementing credible stabilization
policies and institutional reforms.16
Prior to their accession to the EU and the concomitant liberalization
of capital flows, the new southern members were only loosely inte-
grated into the international capital markets. For the time between
1960 and 1988, Argimon and Roldan (1994) find capital mobility to be
substantially lower for Spain, France, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, and
Ireland than for Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. Presumably,
Greece and Portugal would fall into the first group of countries which
exhibited low capital mobility.
For none of the southern EU-members has entry into the EU been
paralleled by a full abolition of capital controls (Table 1). This is a fea-
ture which sets southern and eastern enlargement partly apart - the
new eastern members have already liberalized capital flows to a quite
substantial degree (Backe 1996). According to the annual report on
exchange rate restrictions published by the IMF, the transition econo-
mies under review had indeed imposed less controls on capital ac-
count items in 1995 that the southern Europeans in the early 1990s
(IMF 1996). Although a simple comparison of these indicators has sev-
eral flaws - primarily because of the lack of qualitative information on17



































capital controls in large member countries were fully abolished: 1979
(United Kingdom), 1981 (Germany), 1989 (France), 1990 (Italy)
White Policy Paper on financial integration
proposal for a second banking directive
second Banking Directive becomes effective; member states have to re-
move all remaining barriers to trade
EU membership
authorization to take safeguard measures through the EEC
safeguard clause extended through end 1989
derogation extended for another 6 months
all remaining restrictions on capital flows abolished
EU membership
foreign travel allowances relaxed
controls on purchase of foreign securities relaxed
inward FDI not subject to permission
acquisition of foreign securities eased
outward portfolio investment and FDI liberalized
membership in the EMS
compulsory deposit requirement on foreign exchange accounts abolished
all remaining restrictions abolished
EU membership
controls on outward FDI are relaxed
controls on foreign currency operations of commercial banks are relaxed
outward FDI and trade in medium and long-term foreign securities liberal-
ized
reserve requirement on foreign financial credits imposed (non-remunerated)
membership in the EMS
residents can open ECU accounts
further relaxation capital flows
opening of F/X accounts eased
all remaining restrictions abolished
reintroduction of short-term controls
all remaining restrictions abolished
Source: Bakker (1994), Gros (1993).18
the importance of these restrictions - the pattern is unlikely to reverse
if additional information was taken into account.
6
3.1 Effectiveness of Capital Controls
The liberalization of capital flows in the EU has proceeded gradually
(Table 1). Capital controls in the large member countries have fully
been abolished only in the late 1970s. New members of the Union, in
contrast, in principle have to provide for a free flow of capital within the
EU. While safeguard measures in times of balance of payments prob-
lems may be introduced, pre-conditions for EU membership in the field
of financial markets have become much more stringent and demand-
ing.
The new southern members have made use of the option to retain
capital controls during the first years of their membership. After becom-
ing members of the EU in 1981 (Greece) and 1986 (Portugal and
Spain), the countries retained controls on capital flows up to 1992
(Spain and Portugal) and 1994 (Greece), respectively. Controls on
capital flows outside Europe were even maintained until 1993 in Spain
6 A more appropriate measure of the presence and effectiveness of capital controls
would be empirical tests of the interest parity conditions between foreign and domes-
tic interest rates as well as between onshore and offshore rates. However, lacking
sufficiently long time series, primarily for forward rates, such tests have not been
feasible.19
and 1995 in Greece (IMF 1996). The potential new eastern members,
in contrast, have a relatively liberal capital account regime already prior
to their EU-accession.
7 A priori, the effects of abolishing remaining
controls in the context of EU membership can thus be expected to be
smaller than for the southern members.
Several papers have studied the effectiveness of capital controls.
Baccechetta (1996) finds that controls on capital outflows have been
effective in Spain prior to 1986 but that the effectiveness of capital
controls has vanished subsequently.
8 For Greece, Christodoulakis and
Karamouzis (1993) likewise find that capital controls have been tempo-
rarily effective at best. Otker and Pazarbasioglu (1994) argues that
capital controls have allowed Ireland and Spain to buy some time dur-
ing episodes of speculative crises but - again - have not been effec-
tive over longer time periods. Gros (1993) compares the reasons for
the maintenance of capital controls across Europe. He shows that
Portugal and Spain have used capital controls mainly to prevent capital
inflows from counteracting restrictive monetary policies. In France and
Italy, in contrast, capital controls were used to keep interest rates low
7 See Backe (1996), Buch and Heinrich (1997a, 1997b).
8 Controls on capital inflows were not binding between August 1986 and April 1987,
were binding from April 1987 to April 1990, and again relatively ineffective afterwards.20
through expansionary monetary policies. In both cases, capital controls
have not been effective in the long-run. Yet, they have been effective in
the short-run in Portugal and Spain.
3.2 Structure of Capital Flows
For the southern members, the impact of integration on (net) capital in-
flows has not been uniform (Table 2, Graphs 1 and 2). In particular,
capital inflows do not appear to be directly linked to membership in the
EU. As for Greece, capital inflows relative to GDP were only 0.4 per-
centage points higher in the post- than in the pre-accession phase. In-
flows peaked a few years after accession, in 1985. Similarly, capital in-
flows to Portugal seem to have responded not to EU accession di-
rectly, but to the onset of capital account liberalization three years later.
But even at that time, capital inflows did not reach the level of the years
1981-82, when they exceeded 10 percent of GDP. In Spain, in contrast,
capital inflows relative to GDP increased already in the year prior to
accession. Neither in Portugal nor in Spain were the high initial levels
of inflows sustained. Taking into account that data on net capital in-
flows include transfers from the EU, public capital flows have thus at21
least to a certain degree tended to substitute rather than to comple-
ment private capital flows.
Table 2 — Capital Inflows and Investment Pre- and Post-Accession to the EU
Pre-accession































For Greece, the pre-accession period comprises the time between 1975 and 1980. For Portugal and
Spain, the years 1975-1986 are considered. The post-accession period starts in the first year of
membership and runs through 1994 for Portugal, 1995 for Spain, and 1995 for Greece (gross fixed
investment: 1996).
Source: IMF (1998a), World Bank (1996, 1997); author's calculations.22
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Source: IMF (1998b), World Bank (1997)23
One possible explanation for the surge of inflows into Portugal in the
early 1980s is the fact that a right-wing government was elected in
1980 which may have increased the credibility of reforms (Gibson and
Tsakalotos 1993). In addition, Portugal and Spain were fairly active in
preparing their membership in the Union after they had applied for
membership in 1977 (Laaser and Schrader 1994). Greece, in contrast,
which had already applied in 1975, seems not to have utilized the time
until accession for an active adjustment of regulations and institutions
to EU-standards.
During the 20 years between 1975 and 1995, foreign direct invest-
ment contributed about one fourth to total capital inflows in southern
Europe. While this share has been relatively constant over time for
Greece, Portugal and Spain experienced above-average inflows of FDI
in the 1980s (Table 3). This points to a positive impact of EU-
membership on imports of FDI. Portfolio investment has been negligi-
ble in Greece, while contributing a rising share of capital inflows in the
case of Spain (the share of equity securities being falling).24

























































3.3 Southern versus Eastern Europe
This section compares the capital flows for the two regions southern
Europe ("EU South" - Spain, Portugal, and Greece) and central and
eastern Europe ("CEE3" - the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland).
Concerning total capital inflows it is striking, that CEE3 has received
only a small fraction compared to the funds directed towards the EU25
South (Graph 3a). This holds true for all time periods since 1975, in-
cluding the ones after the beginning of the transition process in CEE3.
However, a more detailed analysis reveals considerable differences for
FDI, portfolio, and other flows? (Graph 3b, 3c and 3d).
The beginning of the reform process around 1990 in the transition
countries marks the start of rising inflows of FDI. The establishment of
new economic policies has encouraged investors with a long-term
perspective to commit their resources to projects in the transition
countries. In 1995, CEE3 attracted more FDI than the EU South
(Graph 3b). As discussed in the previous part about the structure of
capital flows to the EU South, EU membership had a significant impact
on FDI inflows to these countries. However, Graph 3b reveals that FDI
flows to the EU South started to decrease with the beginning of the re-
form process in CEE3. The attractiveness for FDI of a region or a
country is always depending on the relative position within the pool of
potential candidates. Eyeballing the graph appears to indicate that
some of the FDI funds going to CEE3 were diverted from the EU
South. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine, how much FDI one
should expect under "normal circumstances". It might well be that a
9 Other capital flows comprise bank loans and deposits, supplier credits etc.26
country experiences high FDI inflows after the establishment of attrac-
tive investment conditions until the "normal" stock of FDI has been
reached. Consequently, one should expect a decline of the FDI inflows
towards the level sufficient to compensate for depreciation and neces-
sary "FDI-widening" in response to economic growth. The FDI inflow in
the EL) South rose significantly from 1984 until 1990 and has declined
since then. Following the above argument, this might be quite "normal",
and one could expect a similar leveling off for the transition countries
after the FDI stock has reached its "normal" level.
In terms of portfolio and other flows, CEE3 has never reached the
amounts going to the EU South (Graph 3c and 3d). The beginning of
the transition had a significant impact on the portfolio flows heading
towards CEE3, but it did not markedly affect the pattern of the other
capital flows. Portfolio flows towards the CEE3 have started at the be-
ginning of the 1990s and have remained positive since then, whereas
the other flows have continued to meander from positive to negative
values.27
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3.4 German Capital Exports
In order to isolate capital flows within Europe which - arguably - are
more likely to be affected by integration effects than those from outside
the region, we now look at German capital exports only. Between 1990
and 1997, southern and eastern Europe accounted for 4.3 and 1.7 per-
cent of Germany's gross capital exports, respectively (Table 4). This
was more than in the 1980s but - in the case of eastern Europe - not
more than in the 1970s when these economies received quite substan-
tial amounts of foreign loans.
Table 4 — Share (in Percent) of Southern and Eastern Europe in Germany's
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1998)29
As expected, total German net capital exports are strongly influenced
by the re-unification (Graph 4). Following unification, sizable capital ex-
ports of the previous years turned into capital imports which have
gradually become smaller through 1997. Interestingly, Germany has
remained a net exporter of foreign direct investment throughout. Capi-
tal imports have mainly come from industrialized countries. Net capital
exports to Spain, Portugal, and central and eastern Europe, in contrast,
have by and large been positive throughout. This, by itself, suggests
that the motives of Germans to invest abroad are more similar for the
southern EU-members and the transition economies than for these
countries and other industrialized economies.
Net capital exports do not show a uniform EU-effect. While for Spain
net capital imports from Germany increased with membership, this ef-
fect was not clearly visible for Portugal and Greece. In the case of
Spain, however, inflows of FDI peaked only a couple of years after EU
accession. For Greece, membership has hardly had a discernible ef-
fect on capital flows for about five years.30
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For the transition economies, in contrast, the start of the reform proc-
ess has had a quite significant impact on capital flows. Initially, how-
ever, the share of FDI was minor, and FDI came to dominate only since32
1994. With respect to portfolio capital, the region has been a net ex-
porter of capital vis-a-vis Germany during the transition period.
At least two explanations for the relatively weak effect of southern
enlargement on the volume of capital (in)flows are conceivable. First,
an anticipation effect may have been at work. As integration has been
expected prior to the actual enlargement, some positive integration ef-
fects have occurred already before membership became effective.
Second, because capital controls were maintained during a prolonged
period after accession, the irreversibility of investment may not have
declined enough. In addition, the possibility to re-introduce controls in
times of macroeconomic distress may have undermined investors'
confidence in a liberal regime. Hence, de facto liberalization may have
been insufficient.
Looking at the gross capital exports of Germany and comparing ab-
solute values for the EU South (Spain, Portugal, Greece) and the
transition economies (including Russia) shows that although gross
flows to eastern Europe have been larger overall than flows to southern
Europe, the trends are similar (Graph 5). The CEE3 (Hungary, Czech
Republic and Poland) have received the bulk of FDI going into eastern33
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Europe. Perhaps more surprisingly, the overall volume of FDI inflows
into the CEE3 since 1992 has been larger than the flows to southern
Europe. Notice that these figures are influenced by the greater proxim-
ity of Germany to central Europe. As the aggregated data have shown,
the flow of total FDI to southern Europe was substantially higher than
for eastern Europe. In the 1990s, eastern Europe has received 5.9 per-
cent of Germany's FDI abroad as opposed to 4.5 percent for southern
Europe (Table 4). Again, the integration effect for southern Europe
seems to be weaker than the liberalization effect for the CEEs.
The picture looks entirely different for portfolio investment. Whereas
southern Europe has been a gross importer of portfolio capital, the
CEEs have temporarily even been gross exporters. "Other" flows are
substantially different for the CEE3 than for the CEEs, mainly reflecting
lending to Russia.
Data on the structure of the stock of German FDI abroad reveals that
Portugal and Spain seem to have more in common with the CEEs than
with the rest of Europe.
1
0 While less than 30 percent of Germany's FDI
in the EU has been in manufacturing in 1995, the respective shares are
1
0 Comparable data for Greece have not been available. Data referred to in the follow-
ing paragraph were taken from Deutsche Bundesbank (1997).35
62 and 66 percent for southern and eastern Europe. For the EU as a
whole, financial intermediation and insurance is relatively important as
well (40 percent of total stock); for southern and eastern Europe, these
sectors account only for about 9 percent of the stock of FDI.
Overall, the amount of foreign direct investment which the three ad-
vanced transition economies of central and eastern Europe have al-
ready attracted seems large relative to the aggregate level of FDI in
southern Europe (Portugal and Spain). This comparison confirms the
findings by Brenton et al. (1998). While the transition economies may
already be close to their potential with respect to FDI, their access to
foreign portfolio capital is still minor. In the past.external debt finance of
- in many cases - mainly public lenders has been important for some
countries. In the future, private capital, and in particular portfolio capi-
tal, is likely to gain in importance. The creation of a single market for
capital, as required for EU-membership, may be particularly conducive
to this process. For the less advanced reform states of central and
eastern Europe which are not covered in this paper, in contrast, the
prediction is less clear-cut. As all countries have already embarked on
reform programs of some sort, future reforms would need to have
substantial signaling effects in order to yield effects on imports of FDI.36
The case of Greece shows that investors' confidence need not neces-
sarily be enhanced through outside commitments.
In summary, the capital flows from Germany and the flows from all
countries towards the EU South and CEE differ: For Germany, CEE
had a greater importance than for the total of all partner countries. As
mentioned before, this might be determined through the proximity of
Germany to the CEE countries. Furthermore, historical links and some
language advantages (German was the only "Western" language that
could be easily learned within the Socialist bloc, and unified Germany
has many inhabitants that had to learn Russian at school) might have
helped in establishing closer links. With regard to portfolio capital,
however, the picture looks similar in that both flows from Germany and
total flows of portfolio capital towards the EU South exceed those to
CEE by a substantial margin.
3.5 Market Opportunities and Portfolio Choice
The previous discussion has shown that, in quantity terms, the degree
of portfolio investment in the transition economies is below that of the
southern European economies. This may not seem very surprising,
considering that bonds and equities have only fairly recently become37
available in the transition economies and that foreigners face legal and
institutional obstacles when trying to acquire those assets. Hence, cur-
rent portfolio structures are to a substantial degree distorted by institu-
tional factors rather than reflecting market opportunities. Despite these
concerns, the present section takes a closer look at the market oppor-
tunities foreign investors are facing.
Portfolio theory suggests that optimal portfolio choices are deter-
mined by the risk and the return of financial assets as well as the corre-
lation of rates of return between individual assets. Buch and Lapp
(1998) calculate annual data for bond and stock markets in Spain and
Euroland and relates these to market performance in Germany.
1
1 For
the purpose of our analysis, it is particularly of interest to see whether
correlations between bond and equity returns in Spain and Germany
have increased after the unification of the capital market in Europe, i.e.,
after 1992. The data reveal that this has indeed been the case for bond
market returns, independent from being calculated in local currency, D-
Mark or hedged returns. With regard to hedged and local currency re-
1
1 The results of Buch and Lapp also reveal that market opportunities seem to play a
relatively limited role in investment decisions as investment patterns display a very
strong home or currency bias. Accordingly, investment in emerging markets accounts
only for a small fraction of total asset holdings. Yet, there is no reason to assume that
given the small share allocated to emerging markets, the emerging market portfolio
itself is not allocated on the basis of market opportunities.38
turns, correlations between Spanish and German stock returns have
also increased while this is hardly the case for D-Mark returns. Ceteris
paribus, the incentive of Germans to invest in Spanish bonds has thus
declined with the increasing integration of markets if investors hedge or
are interested in local returns.
Table 5 in the Appendix presents similar data for bond and equity
returns in three central European economies (Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Poland), two southern European countries (Portugal and
Spain), as well as for Germany and the United States. Because of the
lack of longer-run time series, monthly data have been used. Evidently,
the higher frequency of the data leads to greater variation because
seasonal factors are not isolated. For bond returns, only data for the
years 1996 through 1998 (May) have been available while for stock in-
dices data started in 1994. Monthly returns in local currency (c) were
calculated as
(1) Monthly Retumc=P^aL_i 1*100
^ Index, )
with t being the current period. Returns in D-Mark were calculated as
(2) MonthlyRetumDM=[fi^
\\ Index,39
with S being the spot rate of the respective currency against the D-
Mark. Standard deviations are calculated as a measure of volatility.
For stock market returns, there are differences between the perform-
ance in local currency and in foreign currency, in particular for the case
of Hungary. While returns in Forint were greater during the entire pe-
riod (1994-1998) than local returns in other currencies (corresponding
also to a greater volatility in returns), this difference disappeared if re-
turns were calculated in foreign currency (DM or US-Dollar). Returns
on Hungarian bonds were now roughly in line with those in the West.
The Czech and the Polish stock markets, in contrast, showed negative
returns on average.
Throughout eastern Europe, volatility was higher than in the West.
Yet, return correlations were similar when comparing Hungary to
southern Europe both relative to returns in Germany and in the US. In
view of the similar return performance and the higher volatility, inves-
tors would thus not have gained from investing in Hungary rather than
in southern Europe. Gains from diversification were higher for the
Czech Republic and for Poland. Returns on Czech stocks particularly
showed a low correlation to US stock returns.40
In the second sub-period (1996-1998) in Western stock markets both
returns and return correlations tended to be higher than in the entire
sample. Standard deviations had remained fairly unchanged. Returns
in eastern Europe were somewhat higher while standard deviations of
returns had declined. For the Czech Republic and Poland - not for
Hungary - return correlations both with the German and with the US
market were lower than in the entire period. Hence, the potential for
risk diversification had increased. During the past three years, stock
markets in the Czech Republic and Poland were thus attractive from
the point of view of a German or US investor because of their relatively
low correlation with Western markets. Yet, substantially lower returns
and higher volatility were a potential impediment to portfolio diversifica-
tion. Conversely, Polish and Czech investors could have gained from
investing abroad.
Data for bond market returns have only been available for this sec-
ond period. While compared to Germany average bond returns were
lower in the West than in the East, bonds in Europe generally per-
formed worse than bonds in the US. Likewise, DM-returns on eastern
European bonds tended to have higher standard deviations than
Western European bonds but were not decidedly different from other41
European bonds when compared to US bonds. Correlations of Spanish
with German bond returns were similar to those of eastern European
bond returns while all European bonds showed fairly little correlation to
US bonds. From the point of view of a German investor, eastern
Europe bond markets thus offered slightly higher risks and returns than
Spanish bonds but not really benefits from diversification. For US in-
vestors, both eastern and western Europe offered gains from diversifi-
cation due to low correlations with US bond returns but also much
lower returns.
The data presented in Table 5 suggests that there are still substantial
differences between stock and bond markets in southern and eastern
Europe. While the limited evidence from Portugal and Spain suggests
that these markets are already relatively closely integrated with mar-
kets in Germany and in the US, this is not the case for eastern mar-
kets, in particular in the Czech Republic and in Poland. While there are
potential gains from diversification, somewhat lower returns and
greater volatility also have to be taken into account. The Hungarian
market, in contrast, already looks more like markets in southern
Europe than like its eastern European counterparts. The situation on
bond markets differs somewhat from these stylized facts because dif-42
ferences in risks and returns are not as pronounced. Both eastern and
western Europe show fairly low correlations with US bonds.
The above exercise can provide only a fairly stylized picture of the
integration of financial markets. In an additional step, we have tested
for the degree of cointegration between stock markets. Essentially,
cointegration analysis can be viewed as a more sophisticated method
of detecting co-movements between the two markets by imposing a
causal structure on the data. A close integration of markets would thus
imply that the potential for diversification is relatively low.
Similar studies have been made by Linne (1997, 1998). He finds that
over the past years, stock markets in eastern Europe were not very
closely linked to world portfolios and that there is a potential for portfo-
lio diversification. He also finds that stock returns in the East and the
West have been converging but that this process has not necessarily
been speeded up by official capital account liberalization. Our ap-
proach differs because we use total return indices rather than price in-
dices, because we consider southern European markets as well, and
because we only test for cointegration with Germany. Table 6 presents
the results of an ADF-Test on a unit root for the logs of the levels and
first differences of the stock market indices. Except for the Polish stock43
index, all indices are 1(1). We have then estimated an error correction
model (ECM), explaining each of the eastern and southern stock indi-
ces by the German stock index and a linear time trend
(3) AIt|
where I = domestic stock index, I* = German stock index, and T =
(linear) time trend. A maximum of four lags has been allowed for, and
insignificant lags have been dropped. The ECM allows us to test
whether there is a stable long-run relationship between these variables
(Hansen 1993). It implies that changes in the domestic stock index de-
pend (i) on deviations from long-run-equilibrium, i.e., on the error-
correction term in brackets, (ii) on short-run effects of changes in the
German and in the domestic stock index, and (iii) on an error term e. If
the coefficient (ao-i) is significantly less than zero, the domestic stock
index declines (increases) if it has been above (below) its equilibrium
level in the previous period. There would thus be a stationary long-run
relationship between the domestic and the foreign stock index, i.e., the
variables would be cointegrated.44













































The table reports the results of an augmented Dickey-Fuller-Test. A regression has been run for the
first difference of each seasonally adjusted variable X, including all exogenous and endogenous vari-
ables, on its lagged level and on its first differences The hypothesis that variable X is non-stationary is
tested against the hypothesis, i.e., X is stationary. The lag-length has been extended such that the
residuals are white noise. A trend (t) and/or a constant term (u.) have been included upon visual in-
spection of the respective time series. Because under HQ the LHS variables are non-stationary, stan-
dard critical values cannot be used, and the MacKinnon critical values are refered to. If the value of
the t-statistic is above the critical level |t | > |t*), X is at least 1(1), i.e., it has to be differenced once to
become stationary. Similarly, running the ADF-test for the differenced variables implies a test of H0:
X is l(2). — a) Trend, intercept, lag length. — All variables in logarithms.
The results are presented in Table 7. In terms of statistical signifi-
cance, there are cointegration relations only between the Hungarian
and the Spanish stock index vis-a-vis the German stock index. The
significance of the error correction term can not be rejected at the 10-45
percent level of confidence in both cases, and the R
2s exceed 0.4 and
0.6, respectively. The relationship between the indices is also signifi-
cant in economic terms: an increase in the German stock index by 1
percent raises the stock indices in Spain and Hungary by nearly 1.5
and 2 percent, respectively. Results for the other three stock markets
are less satisfying from a statistical point of view: there are no signifi-
cant cointegration relationships at the conventional significance levels,
the R
2s are much smaller for the Czech Republic and Poland, and the
impact of the German stock index is not significant in these two cases.
The latter two indicators are somewhat better for Portugal but this
equation fails most of the conventional tests on the assumptions of the
OLS-model.
1
2 Notice, however, that the weaker integration of markets,
the greater the potential for diversification.
In summary, our analysis has shown that a relatively weak correlation
of returns on eastern and western securities' markets, coupled with
higher returns in the east should induce investors to increase the share
of eastern assets in their portfolios. Higher risks in the east have a
countervailing effect, in contrast. Because we have not explicitly de
1
2 Unless indicated otherwise, the equations pass the conventional tests.46
























































































c index. See Table 5 for data
maximum lag length of four months has been allowed for (A -x, x = 1





















10) percent level. Critical values were taken from Banerjee et al. (1992) for T=50. t-
values appear in parantheses. — Dummy variables are set equal to 1
JB = reports result of Jarque Bera test on normal distribution of the r
rejecting the hypothesis that the residuals follow a normal distribution)
in the month indicated. —
esiduals (probability of not
— LM1 and LM4 = report
result of Lagrange Multiplier Tests on 1st and 4th order autocorrelation (probability of not rejecting
the hypothesis that the residuals are uncorrelated); -- White = reports result of White test on het-
eroscedasticity (probability of not rejecting the hypothesis that the residuals are homoscedastic)47
rived the structure of an optimal portfolio, we cannot weigh these fac-
tors. It is also problematic to extrapolate market opportunities of the
past into the future as structural breaks may occur. One such structural
break is the introduction of the Euro. Because of the elimination of ex-
change rate risk between members of Euroland, we could expect some
portfolio re-allocation towards eastern markets to the extent that inves-
tors wish to retain a certain currency diversification of their portfolios.
4. Enlargement, Investment, and Growth
Economic theory would predict that the integration of capital-rich and
capital-poor countries and in particular the liberalization of capital flows
would lead to higher investment and growth. Contrary to these expec-
tations, however, the stylized facts of enlargement reveal that member-
ship in the EU has not led to a significant sustained increase in capital
imports, in the investment share of GDP, and in growth rates in new
member states (Graphs 6, 7).48
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While gross investment in fixed capital has generally increased after
accession to the EU, it has not been sustained at this higher level. In
Greece, gross investment hardly responded to EU membership, and
an increase in the investment rate could only be observed after 1988.
While Spain experienced a phase of investment-led growth in the years
immediately following accession (Baldwin 1993: 137), the share of in-
vestment in GDP fell in the 1990s. In Portugal, fixed investment had al-
ready soared in the early 1980s in response to the increased capital in-
flows. In contrast to Spain, however, a decline in the investment rate in
later years could be averted.
On average, the share of investment in GDP has not been higher in
the years after accession to the EU than before and has even come
down a little (Table 2). This implies that (at least) temporarily higher
capital imports, i.e., foreign savings, have tended to substitute rather
than to augment domestic savings. In a static sense, they would not
have contributed to higher growth. Yet, this interpretation leaves the ef-
ficiency gains through foreign (direct) investment out of consideration:
the same amount of investment in absolute terms may result in higher
growth if foreign investors use the capital stock more efficiently.50
GDP-growth in the pre-accession periods has been about the same
as in the post-accession period (Graph 6). This may indeed imply that
the efficiency of investment has increased somewhat (because the
same level of growth is achieved with lower investment). However,
GDP growth is only a very rough proxy because it is affected also by a
number of other variables (as, for example, the oil crises of the 1970s).
The difference between the national income and the EU average did
not diminish continuously over time (Graph 8), let alone at an acceler-
ated rate after membership in the European Union. Greece had already
reached almost 63 percent of the EU average in 1973 and meandered
around this value for more than 20 years - despite EU-membership in
1981 - before it could reduce the gap a bit further within the last five
years. Spain enjoyed in 1975 already a higher GDP relative to the EU
average than in 1997 - also despite EU-membership more than a dec-
ade ago. Portugal succeeded only in 1989 to surpass the GDP relative
to the EU average it already had in 1973. Nevertheless, the economic
development of Portugal since membership in 1986 allowed a continu-
ous closing of the gap. One country which has managed to completely
close the gap to the European mean within the last decade is Ireland.
However, this cannot be attributed to EU membership. With a GDP per51
capita of 64 percent of the EU average in 1986, Ireland had been just a
bit richer than at the 61 percent it had in 1960 - despite EU-
membership since 1971 .^
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Gross Domestic Product at current market prices per head of population as percentage
of EU (15) average. Three year moving average. Purchasing Power Estimates. The
EU(15) average includes since 1991 the data for the unified Germany. • Membership in
the European Community, Ireland 1973, Greece 1981, Portugal and Spain 1986.
Source: European Commission (1997); own calculations.
Overall, the anticipated growth effects of EU-membership cannot be
validated in a convincing manner by the empirical facts of the former
enlargement of the European Union and the concomitant liberalization
1
3 Econometric tests did not reveal a significant, positive coefficient for an EU-
membership dummy in regression equations for Greece, Portugal and Spain. GDP
per capita as a percentage of the European average has been regressed on a time
trend. Neither the change of the observed time period from 1960-1997 to the period
1970-1997 nor the inclusion of an additional German unification dummy led to signifi-
cant, positive EU-membership dummies.52
of capital flows. The fact that we are looking at only a relatively short
time-span could be one explanation of this puzzle. If integration has
only a gradual influence on growth and investment, its full effect may
not be captured in the relatively short time series under consideration.
Moreover, capital account liberalization and integration effects are only
two factors which affect growth and investment. Rodrik (1997) particu-
larly argues that a detailed analysis of the domestic investment climate
is needed in order to assess the benefits of integration. Negative exter-
nal shocks and adverse domestic policies have to some extent run
counter to the positive integration effects. However, we have not cap-
tured these factors in our analysis.
Laaser (1997) essentially supports the latter hypothesis. He dis-
cusses the progress of the southern European countries for a set of
essential criteria.
1
4 Spain and Portugal confronted only with delay the
challenges of integration and still suffer from some severe shortcom-
ings in their policy environment. For example Spain still endures sig-
nificant labor market rigidities and high unemployment and Portugal
bears with considerable monopolies in the service sector. But both
1
4 These are the establishment of private ownership, opening up of all markets, securing
competition, integration into the world economy, efficient distribution of macro-
economic responsibilities, balance of power and establishment of the rule of law.53
countries attempted in the last years - under considerable adjustment
costs - to reform the macroeconomic setting of their economies, which
were marked by high national debt and inflation rates. Overall, Spain
and Portugal were successful in reducing the gap of the living stan-
dards of their inhabitants to the European average. As for Greece,
market forces have even been weakened since the beginning of EU-
membership, and too much seems to have been expected from the fi-
nancial transfers from the European budget. Greece failed to reform its
policies and its economy and fell back in the relative income level. This
failure of Greece to reform and the willingness of Portugal and Spain to
adjust their economies has been underlined by the recent decision to
include the latter two but not Greece into the group of Euro-countries.
A final explanation for the lack of significant positive integration ef-
fects is connected to the households' high rate of time preference
(Piazolo 1997). If households are reluctant to accept deviations from a
uniform pattern of consumption over time, they would try to smoothen
consumption over time. An improvement in the economic setting (for
example in terms of lower transaction costs due to lower uncertainty
because of EU-membership) will lead to higher production and there-
fore to an expected future increase in consumption. If households are54
characterized by a high rate of time preference, consumption will be
shifted from the future to the present, and investment financed by the
domestic households will be low. Consequently, the income conver-
gence with the average EU member will take a long time, although
positive welfare effects through higher consumption will be felt already
in the short run. Foreign investors will make use of the improved cir-
cumstances in the country, but this increase in savings might not be
enough to compensate for the domestic move from investment to con-
sumption.
The various strands of explanations point to different causes of>
missing or delaying the growth bonus of EU-membership and capital
account liberalization, but the lack of adjustment of domestic policies
and the shift from domestic investment to consumption are the most
plausible explanations.
5. The Message for the Transition Economies
As regards the structure and volume of capital flows, the advanced
transition economies under review and the southern members of the
EU appear to be surprisingly similar. While the southern Europeans
have attracted sizable capital inflows in the early 1990s which are not55
necessarily linked to EU-membership but rather to the liberalization of
capital flows within Europe, the transition economies have attracted
substantial inflows of capital after starting the reform process. In par-
ticular with respect to FDI from Germany, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Poland have surpassed southern Europe in recent years.
With regard to the structure of FDI, the two groups of countries are
closer to each other than to the EU-average.
The most important difference between the eastern and the southern
Europeans is the lack of access to foreign portfolio capital of thejor-
mer. As EU-membership requires further harmonization of financial
market regulation and better market access of foreign financial institu-
tions, this is likely to reverse. Differences in market opportunities and
imperfect integration of stock and bond markets enhance the attrac-
tiveness of eastern European markets for Western investors. Just as
Western investors can gain from increasing eastern Europe's share in
their portfolios the transition economies can gain from being able to
hold internationally diversified asset portfolios.
Membership in the European Union, participation in the Single Mar-
ket, and the integration into the international capital markets can ac-
celerate structural changes, foster economic growth and raise living56
standards. If, however, domestic economic policies hamper the neces-
sary transformation within an economy, EU-membership alone cannot
assure significant amelioration of the economic setting.
This is borne out by the stylized facts from southern enlargement.
Spain and Portugal implemented consistent and comprehensive eco-
nomic reforms only with delay, while Greece even failed to make sig-
nificant progress well into the 1990s. Moreover, as domestic savings
have at times been substituted rather than complemented by foreign
savings, the positive impact of capital inflows on domestic investment
has been dampened. Thus, (net) capital inflows have not increased
immediately after EU-membership, increased investment has not been
sustained, and initial growth effects have leveled off.
The transition countries in central and eastern Europe can profit from
these experiences. Membership in the European Union can support
growth-enhancing developments and might even accelerate the
catching up with the west European neighbors, but it cannot by itself
guarantee ongoing convergence. Sound domestic policies within the
central and eastern European Countries to facilitate further transforma-
tion and permanent structural change are the condito sine qua non for
rising living standards.57
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Note to Table 5:
Monthly returns. Average returns = geometric averages. End of period. Share indices = Datastream total return indices for Germany,
Poland, United States, Portugal and Spain; IFC total return indices for Czech Republic and Hungary. Bond indices = Deutsche Mor-
gan Grenfell DMG EE total return indices for eastern Europe (maturity of debt instruments = 3 months), Datastream total return indi-
ces for 1-3 year T-bills otherwise. Exchange rates to the D-Mark = spot rates.